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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I am honored to have been included in this Symposium on Jack Balkin’s 
new book, The Cycles of Constitutional Time.1  Professor Balkin is a giant in 
the legal academy and a public intellectual of the first rank.  Here, as 
elsewhere,2 he has written a book that combines careful study of American 
history and constitutionalism with lucid, propulsive prose.  The other 
contributors to this Symposium are themselves a Who’s Who in constitutional 
law, history, and political science.  I am not sure I quite belong in this exalted 
company.  Even though I have written about some specialized – if sometimes 
topical – corners of the American Constitution,3 I am not a constitutional 
theorist in the large sense.  I am also not a trained historian.  Such historical 
writing as I have done is mostly small-bore inquiries into things like the 
import of homicide prosecutions in Boone County, Missouri, in the Civil War 
era,4 or might be disparaged by real certificated historians as what Alfred 
Kelly labeled “law office history.”5  Nor am I a political scientist, despite 
having the bachelor’s degree in that topic that so often presages a descent into 
law school.  I am just an old criminal lawyer who now teaches and writes 
about whatever interests him.  Hence, I am not really qualified to critique 
constitutional theory of the sweep presented in Professor Balkin’s book.  
Nonetheless, reading it has not only informed me, but stimulated a few 
questions, which I explore in this Article.  
There is a great deal to admire about the substance of this book, 
particularly its analysis of the difficult constitutional moment in which we 
now find ourselves, as well as its interweaving of large themes into a hopeful 
vision of our constitutional resilience.  Still, I confess to remaining 
unconvinced of the central proposition encapsulated in the book’s title – that 
history, particularly American constitutional history, moves in identifiable 
cycles.  I am particularly doubtful that such cycles, if they exist, are those 
described by Professor Balkin.  A full exegesis of my concerns on this score 
 
1. JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2020). 
2. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH 
IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2d prtg. 2014). 
3. See, e.g., FRANK O. BOWMAN, III, HIGH CRIMES & MISDEMEANORS: A 
HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP (2019); Frank O. Bowman, III, 
Presidential Pardons and the Problem of Impunity, 23 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
__ (2021); Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled 
American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 
367 (2010).  
4. Frank O. Bowman, III, Getting Away With Murder (Most of the Time): Civil 
War-Era Homicide Cases in Boone County, Missouri, 76 MO. L. REV. 323 (2012); 
Frank O. Bowman, III, Stories of Crimes, Trials, and Appeals in Civil War Era 
Missouri, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 349 (2009). 
5. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. 
REV. 119, 122 n.13. I rather hope that some of my historical output rises above the 
level that provoked Kelly’s jibe, but I am no proper judge of that question. 
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would run as long as the book itself, so I will raise only three, and those only 
in outline. 
II.  HISTORICAL TIME 
Time, certainly as humans experience it, is linear.  For us, its arrows run 
one direction only.  I realize that the folks in the Physics Department will 
probably insist that in some weird corners of the relativistic universe time can 
stop,6 or perhaps even run backwards.7  But that is not true in the humanly 
observable sections we inhabit. 
There certainly are cyclical phenomena.  But cyclicity presumes entities 
moving or interacting in a system that has laws governing the interactions of 
all its components during a period with more or less constant conditions.  Day 
turns to night, and reliably back to day.  Fall progresses to winter and then to 
spring, then to summer, then back to fall.  Leaves turn brown and drop, snow 
comes, snow melts, leaves return.  All this happens, and is observable to us, 
because the rules of physics govern, quite intractably, the actions of large 
masses like the sun and the earth interacting in a vacuum, and because the 
rules of biology – the physics of life – respond to those recurring phenomena 
in verifiable and predictable ways. 
Perhaps, in the mind of God, human behavior in the mass is subject to 
its own set of rules decreeing cyclicity or perhaps oscillation between various 
states of temporary equilibrium.  But I doubt that.  My own observations 
suggest that history – constitutional and otherwise – is both linear and pretty 
contingent.  Even radically contingent. 
If some jittery North Carolinian Confederates hadn’t shot Stonewall 
Jackson at Chancellorsville in 1863,8 then maybe he and not that old slowpoke 
James Longstreet would have been commanding the Confederate right two 
months later at Gettysburg.9  In which case, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain’s 
 
6. See RICHARD MORRIS, TIME’S ARROWS 175–80 (1984) (noting that, in theory, 
time would stop at the event horizon of a black hole). 
7. Id. at 161–62 (describing the as-yet unconfirmed possibility of particles called 
tachyons which might move faster than the speed of light and thus backwards in time); 
Bertrand Wong, Existence of Tachyons and their Detection, 8 RES. & REVS.: J. 
PHYSICS 23–26 (2019). 
8. BYRON FARWELL, STONEWALL: A BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL THOMAS J. 
JACKSON 506–08, 520–26 (1992) (describing the friendly fire shooting of Jackson at 
the Battle of Chancellorsville on May 2, 1863, and his later death on May 10, 1863); 
ERNEST B. FURGURSON, CHANCELLORSVILLE: 1863 201–06, 325–28 (1992) (same). 
9. STEPHEN W. SEARS, GETTYSBURG 254–57 (2004) (describing disagreement 
between General Robert E. Lee and General Longstreet about the timing and 
positioning of the assault by the Confederate right on the second day of the Battle of 
Gettysburg).  As an aside, I should note that in characterizing General Longstreet as a 
3
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20th Maine maybe doesn’t have time to get into position at the end of the 
Union line on Little Round Top.10  And Lee’s men pour over the hill and 
behind the Union Army.  Meade flees back to Washington.11  A discouraged 
North forces Lincoln to sue for peace.  And we have two, or maybe three, or 
even four countries where the United States now sits. 
Nor do I think historical contingency is limited to the dramatic 
circumstances of war.  Suppose that late in 2019, some wayward coronavirus 
in a Chinese bat or pangolin had not mutated in just the right way to make it 
transmissible to humans.12  Or that particular bat or pangolin had not been 
brought to the Wuhan wet market.  In which case we would not have had a 
global pandemic raging, and being grotesquely mishandled, in an election 
year by President Donald Trump.13  Without that wayward Chinese virus 
particle, one rather suspects Mr. Trump would have won.  And the 
 
“slowpoke” in the text above, I do so only for rhetorical effect.  Longstreet was a very 
good general.  He may have been deliberate, but at Gettysburg he was certainly right 
to want to move around the flank of the powerful Union position rather than assaulting 
it head-on, as Lee stubbornly insisted on doing. On the other hand, had Longstreet 
moved faster to carry out an order he disagreed with, perhaps the Union’s own 
tardiness in securing Little Round Top, which anchored the left flank of the Union 
line, might have produced success. 
10. Id. at 269–71, 292–97. In the late afternoon of July 2, 1863, in the middle of 
the Confederate assault, Union General Gouverneur Warren discovered, to his shock, 
that the rocky hill anchoring the Union left, immortalized in American history as Little 
Round Top, was undefended. Id. at 269. He hastily sought troops to man the hill. Col. 
Strong Vincent took the initiative to place his brigade on the height. Id. at 270–71. 
Among his units was the 20th Maine, commanded by Col. Joshua Lawrence 
Chamberlain, which was stationed on the farthest left flank of the Union line.  The 
20th Maine’s desperate fight to hold the hill may have saved the entire Union position. 
That fight, and Chamberlain’s later remarkable combat record, revealed Chamberlain 
as one of the most outstanding combat officers of the Civil War. For a brief description 
of his life, see James M. McPherson’s introduction to the 1993 edition of 
Chamberlain’s own war memoir, JOSHUA LAWRENCE CHAMBERLAIN, THE PASSING OF 
THE ARMIES ix–xxi (1993). Chamberlain became famous in the 20th Century due to 
his appearance as a central character in a novel about Gettysburg, MICHAEL SHAARA, 
THE KILLER ANGELS (1974). 
11. The reference is to General George G. Meade, who commanded the Union 
Army at Gettysburg. SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE, 
FREDERICKSBURG TO MERIDIAN 462–64 (1963). 
12. See Evolution of pandemic coronavirus outlines path from animals to 
humans, SCIENCE DAILY (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/05/200529161221.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4CSR-D3Y6]; Y. R. Rastogi, et al., The novel coronavirus 2019-
nCoV: Its evolution and transmission into humans causing global COVID-19 
pandemic, INT. J. ENV’T SCI. TECH. 1–8 (May 26, 2020) 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7247958/ [https://perma.cc/Z4W5-
X8MB]. 
13. Id.; Presidential Election Results: Biden Wins, NEW YORK TIMES (last 
accessed February 5, 2021) 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/03/us/elections/results-president.html. 
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constitutional history of the United States might soon be coming to another 
kind of end. 
Even if there are discoverable rules or forces bending societies toward 
cyclicity, I tend to think that the history of the United States is probably a 
uniquely poor place to discover them.  This country, whether conceived 
geographically or demographically, culturally or economically, or using 
virtually any other significant metric, has changed so radically and so 
constantly throughout its entire relatively short life that even treating the 
United States of 2021 as the same country as the United States of 1788 or the 
United States of 1860 or 1870 or 1929 or 1945 seems an almost categorical 
error.  In the types, magnitude, and speed of changes we have undergone, we 
are immediately distinguishable from, say Britain or France, or even China or 
Japan, all of which have changed over time, of course, but all of which have 
maintained a far greater degree of geographic, ethnic, and cultural 
consistency, even as their forms of government have changed quite 
dramatically.  As much as I admire the ambition of Professor Balkin’s book, 
any effort to isolate a small number of factors that have both persisted 
throughout the life of our uniquely fluid country and remained so powerful 
that they could bend its history into recurring cycles, like the gravitational 
mass of the sun entrapping planets in its orbit, seems an improbable 
undertaking. 
Moreover, Professor Balkin proposes, not one type of historical cycle, 
but three, each operating “on a different time scale,”14 and thus it would seem 
more or less independently of one another, but nonetheless interacting from 
time to time to cause particularly notable effects.15  His three cycles are the 
“cycle of the rise and fall of regimes,” the “cycle of polarization and 
depolarization,” and the “cycle of constitutional rot and constitutional 
renewal.”16  This brief Article is not the forum for examining all three cycles 
and their interplay, so I am going to consider only the cycle of constitutional 
rot and focus primarily on the first of the three eras of such rot identified by 
Professor Balkin – the period immediately preceding the Civil War.  
 
14. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 6 (“Each of these cycles operates on a different 
time scale.”). 
15. As an aside, I am a bit puzzled by the assertion that these cycles operate 
asynchronously because Professor Balkin identifies polarization as one of the four 
causes of constitutional rot. Id. at 49.  If all four causes must be present for 
constitutional rot to occur, then the turn of the cycle of polarization from non-polarized 
to polarized will always coincide with the turn of the cycle of constitutional rot from 
renewal to rot. I suppose this means that one can have cyclical polarization without 
rot, so long as the other three causes of rot do not happen to appear at the right moment 
in the polarization cycle. Id. 
16. Id. at 6. 
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III.  CONSTITUTIONAL ROT AND THE SECESSION CRISIS OF 1860 
Professor Balkin describes constitutional rot as “the decay of those 
features of a constitutional system that maintain it as both a democracy and as 
a republic,”17 in particular, “the process by which a constitutional system 
becomes less democratic and less republican over time.”18  He adds that this 
rot “has a second dimension: the gradual destruction of political norms of 
mutual forbearance and fair political competition that make it possible for 
people who disagree with each other to jointly pursue the public good.”19  The 
“third dimension” of constitutional rot, Balkin says, is “loss of the kinds of 
trust that are necessary for republics to function properly.”20 
Later, Balkin identifies four “causes” of rot that he colorfully dubs the 
“Four Horsemen of Constitutional Rot”: political polarization, increasing 
economic inequality, loss of trust, and “policy disasters.”21  Astute readers 
may already perceive two oddities in this typology.  Professor Balkin 
explicitly identifies loss of trust as both a characteristic of constitutional rot 
and as one of its causes.22  Moreover, the “second dimension” of rot – 
destruction of norms of forbearance and fair political competition that make 
possible joint pursuit of the public good – sounds an awful lot like “political 
polarization.”  Unless there is a sharp distinction between these two ideas that 
I have not perceived, then polarization, too, is seemingly defined as both a 
characteristic and a cause of rot.  At least these two components of the cycle 
of constitutional rot assume a sort of Zen koan-like status as both cause and 
effect, or perhaps causeless causes. 
Be that as it may, in order for there to be a cycle of constitutional rot, 
there must be multiple instances of it over a period of time.  Professor Balkin 
identifies three: the period of the 1850s during which northern and southern 
states gradually fell into mutual recrimination and finally civil war; the Gilded 
Age; and our own period.23  As an aside, the designation of the Gilded Age as 
the second of three major cycles of American constitutional rot is a bit peculiar 
in itself.  Professor Balkin’s hypothesis of constitutional rot is that rot 
happens, is followed by a period of democratic and republican renewal leading 
to a new constitutional equilibrium, which is followed inevitably by decay 
toward another period of rot.24  Professor Balkin’s first 1850s episode of rot 
 
17. Id. at 44. 
18. Id. at 45. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 46. 
21. Id. at 49. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 45. Perhaps Balkin mentions these three only as the best illustrations 
of a larger set of frequent rotten oscillations, but, if so, I would need to know more 
about which other periods he would include in order to fully assess his thesis. Id. at 
45. 
24. Id. at 48. 
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culminated in the explosion of bloodshed of the Civil War, which ran from 
1861-1865, and was itself followed by the turbulence of Reconstruction, 
which did not sputter to its unsatisfactory and ignominious close until roughly 
1877.25   
The peculiarity is that the Gilded Age is variously considered to have 
begun as soon as the end of the Civil War in 1865 or as late as the end of 
Reconstruction in 1877, and to have ended around 1895.26  Mark Twain gave 
the era its name with the title of his co-authored novel, The Gilded Age: A 
Tale of Today, published in 1873.27  Hence, it is hard to see a meaningful 
interval of democratic and republican renewal between the first two of 
Professor Balkin’s major cycles of constitutional rot.  Whatever 
Reconstruction was, it certainly was not a period of equilibrium from which 
later events were a species of decay.  Such equilibrium as emerged from the 
War and Reconstruction (a highly unsatisfactory one for America’s new 
freedmen) came later, during the very period Balkin identifies as another cycle 
of constitutional rot.  Certainly, if there was a sort of calm 
democratic/republican interregnum before the constitutionally rotten Gilded 
Age, it was awfully brief.  In sum, Professor Balkin’s chronology of the cycles 
of constitutional rot begins with the founding in 1788, presents its first 
instance of major rot from 1850 to 1861, its second sometime in the 1870s 
through the 1890s, and no major repetition until our own day, more than a 
century later.28 If there are cycles here, they recur at oddly irregular intervals.   
But let us consider in somewhat greater detail the crisis of the 1850s, the 
first of Professor Balkin’s periods of constitutional rot.29  To do so, begin with 
the transformation of the United States of America between the ratification of 
the Constitution in 1788 and the country that stood on the precipice of war in 
1860.  
In 1788, there were as yet only thirteen states, together with contiguous 
territories that would shortly become states, such as Kentucky, Vermont, 
Tennessee, and Ohio.30  These states and territories contained roughly 3.9 
 
25. See generally, ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988). 
26. CHRISTOPHER M. NICHOLS & NANCY C. UNGER, A COMPANION TO THE 
GILDED AGE AND PROGRESSIVE ERA 7 (2017); BERNARD A. WEISBERGER, THE LIFE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. 7: 1877-1890, THE AGE OF STEEL AND STEAM 
37 (1964). 
27. MARK TWAIN & CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, THE GILDED AGE: A TALE OF 
TODAY (1873). 
28. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 45. 
29. Id. 
30. List of U.S. states by date of admission to the Union, WIKIPEDIA (last edited 
Feb. 2, 2021), 
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million souls, overwhelmingly Northern European whites, predominantly 
British and Protestant, plus 694,000 Black African slaves and a steadily 
dwindling number of Native Americans.31  West of the advancing line of 
American settlement lay a vast tract of largely unexplored territory stretching 
over two thousand miles to the Pacific Ocean, land primarily inhabited by 
Native Americans, but claimed, and settled in pockets, by subjects of France, 
Spain, and Great Britain.32  In 1790, west of the Ohio Valley, virtually the 
only European settlements were New Orleans and Baton Rouge (then held by 
the Spanish), outposts maintained by the French on the Mississippi River, 
such as St. Louis, and small Spanish settlements in Texas, at Santa Fe, and in 
a string of missions along the California coast.33 
By 1860, only a single long-ish lifetime from the American founding, 
the United States extended to the Pacific Ocean, with thirty-three states 
already admitted to the Union,34 and multiple territories in the process of being 
subdivided, remorselessly cleared of Native inhabitants,35 and prepared for 
incorporation into the whole.  This massive conquest added roughly two 




31. 1790 United States census, WIKIPEDIA (last edited Dec. 19, 2020), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1790_United_States_census [https://perma.cc/CS5G-
YQPU]. 
32. Russia also made largely notional claims on parts of the Pacific Northwest. 
33. Colonial history of the United States, WIKIPEDIA (last edited Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonial_history_of_the_United_States 
[https://perma.cc/E9QD-PP9D]. 




35. For partial treatments of this long, sad story, see generally, DEE BROWN, 
BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970); S.C. GWYNNE, EMPIRE OF THE SUMMER 
MOON: QUANAH PARKER AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COMANCHES, THE MOST 
POWERFUL INDIAN TRIBE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2010). 
36. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 alone added over 800,000 square miles to 
U.S. possession. National Archvies and Records Administration, AMERICAN 
ORIGINALS, https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/american_originals/loupurch.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZRX5-HY5F] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).  The annexation of the 
Republic of Texas in 1845 added another 389,166 square miles in what are now the 
states of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Wyoming. Republic of Texas, 
WIKIPEDIA, (last edited Mar. 27, 2021) 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Texas [https://perma.cc/9JMJ-5UZL]. A 
treaty with Great Britain in 1846 confirmed U.S. possession of the Oregon Territory 
covering the current states of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and part of Montana.  The 
Oregon Territory, 1846, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEPT, OF STATE, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/oregon-territory 
[https://perma.cc/6Q86-Z2GL] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).  The Oregon Territory 
covered 286,541 square miles. US Territorial Acquisitions, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 
8
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not only subjugated indigenous peoples, but large populations of other 
distinctly un-British folks – French Creoles in Louisiana; Mexicans of 
Spanish or Spanish-Indian heritage in Texas (annexed in 1845) and in the 
territories the United States stole after the Mexican-American War of 1846-
48; and Chinese in growing numbers in California.37  These new U.S. subjects 
in the American West had little or no experience of republican self-
governance and were mostly Catholic or of no Christian confession.  
Meanwhile, the perceived need for manpower to settle, till, and exploit the 
newly acquired western land, and to work the mines and factories of the 
industrializing north, drew across the Atlantic a steady flow of non-English-
speaking, culturally diverse, European immigrants.38  Of equal or greater 
importance, at least in national politics, was the survival, flourishing, and 
regionalization in the South of slavery as an economic driver and cultural 
institution.39  By 1860, the U.S. population had increased ten-fold compared 
to 1790 and stood at more than 31 million,40 3.9 million of whom were slaves, 
almost all resident in fourteen southern or border states.41 
In short, the United States of 1860 may have had the same paper 
constitution as was adopted in 1788 and the same formal governmental 
structure, but it was otherwise almost incommensurably different.  Professor 
 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/us-westward-expansion/25994.html 
[https://perma.cc/R7P2-VHCF] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021). The conquests of the 
Mexican-American War added another 525,000 square miles in 1848. The Annexation 
of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845–
1848, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/texas-
annexation#:~:text=Under%20the%20terms%20of%20the,by%20Mexico%20to%20
U.S.%20citizens [https://perma.cc/HG24-U4MQ] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021). The 
Gadsden Purchase of 1853 brought in another 29,670 miles from Mexico. US 
Territorial Acquisitions, supra. 
37.  See generally, Anthony Daniel Perez & Charles Hirschman, The Changing 
Racial and Ethnic Composition of the US Population: Emerging American Identities, 
35 POPUL. DEV. REV. 1–51 (2009); History of Chinese Americans, WIKIPEDIA, (last 
edited Mar. 28, 2021), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Chinese_Americans#First_wave:_the_begi
nning_of_Chinese_immigration [https://perma.cc/L5XA-5LY6]. 
38. See generally Frederick C. Luebke, "Introduction" to EUROPEAN 
IMMIGRANTS IN THE AMERICAN WEST: Community Histories, UNIV. OF NEW 
MEXICO PRESS (1998), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/historyfacpub/172 
[https://perma.cc/V9KU-MKDR] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
39. See U.S CENSUS BUREAU, 1860 Census: Population of the United States 599 
(1864) (cataloguing the distribution of enslaved peoples by state). 
40. Id. at 597.  
41. Id. at 595. 
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Balkin describes the crisis of the 1850s as a period of “constitutional rot.”42  
And I suppose it was, in the sense that the country was sliding toward disunion 
and war.  But it seems very hard to argue, as Balkin does, that the events and 
conditions of the period immediately preceding the Civil War constituted the 
first instance of a recurrent “cycle” of “constitutional rot” in the special sense 
he employs that term.  
The causes of the political breakdown that led to war were unique.  To 
oversimplify dramatically: The Constitution of 1788 permitted (perhaps 
inevitably given the interlocking interests of Southern agriculturalists and 
Northern merchants) the survival of slavery.  The naïve hopes of many 
Framers that slavery would fade away were thwarted by, among other things, 
the invention of the cotton gin and the rise of British (and later American) 
cotton textile manufacturing, which together made slavery terrifically 
profitable in the growing conditions of the American South.43  In the North, 
slavery, never an economic pillar, was increasingly viewed as both a moral 
abomination and as threateningly incompatible with the economic interests of 
free-labor Northern industry and agriculture.44  The division between 
Northern and Southern views on slavery extended even into religious life.  
Formerly national Christian denominations split into sectional pro-slavery and 
anti-slavery churches, creating schisms that persist in some cases to the 
present day.45 
Had the country not been in the midst of a dramatic westward expansion, 
the interests of North and South might have remained in uneasy equipoise far 
longer than they did.  But cotton depletes soil rapidly, which pushed slave-
holding planters steadily west as old fields wore out.46  Northerners in general 
resisted westward expansion of slavery, for a mixture of moral and economic 
reasons.47  Southerners feared that, if slavery was prohibited in the newly 
 
42. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 49. 
43. See SVEN BECKERT, THE EMPIRE OF COTTON: A GLOBAL HISTORY 98–135 
(2014). Slavery was also integral to the production of important agricultural and 
industrial commodities other than cotton, particularly rice, indigo, and tobacco. 
WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED 
STATES CONGRESS 11 (1996). 
44. See, e.g., CHARLES & MARY BEARD, II THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 
3–10 (1927); JOSHUA R. GIDDINGS, SPEECHES IN CONGRESS [1841-1852] 104–05, 
254–57 (1853), excerpted at 73-75 in KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 73–75 (1959) (noting that Southern opposition persistently defeated “free-labor” 
legislation favored by Northern states). 
45. See Allen Carden, Religious Schism As a Prelude to the American Civil War: 
Methodists, Baptists, and Slavery, 24 ANDREWS UNIV. SEMINARY STUDIES 13 (1986), 
https://www.andrews.edu/library/car/cardigital/Periodicals/AUSS/1986-1/1986-1-
03.pdf [https://perma.cc/W45C-LXHN] (describing schisms during the 1840s in both 
American Baptist and Methodist churches dividing pro-slavery congregations in the 
South and anti-slavery congregations in the North into separate religious conventions). 
46. BECKERT, supra note 43, at 103. 
47. See generally, STEVEN E. WOODWORTH, MANIFEST DESTINIES: AMERICA'S 
WESTWARD EXPANSION AND THE ROAD TO THE CIVIL WAR (2010). 
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forming western states, pro-slavery interests would in short order be rendered 
a permanent and shrinking minority in Congress and effectively excluded 
from competition for the presidency.48  Once the political balance shifted far 
enough against them, Southerners believed, slavery itself would inevitably be 
banned and their economic and social structure utterly overturned.49 
In short, the country was divided by an irreconcilable disagreement over 
a single institution, human chattel slavery, which nonetheless implicated 
virtually every area of human thought and endeavor – religion, morals, 
economics, social ordering, national identity, and politics.  Slavery and its 
place in the unique circumstances of nineteenth-century America was the 
central, indispensable cause of the dissension that led to the Civil War.50  
Accordingly, the constitutional deterioration of the 1850s just will not fit into 
Balkin’s model of cycles caused by the “Four Horseman of Constitutional 
Rot” – political polarization, loss of trust, increasing economic inequality, and 
policy disasters.51 
I would certainly agree that the political disintegration of the 1850s was 
characterized by political polarization and loss of trust.  The polarization 
between political factions and leaders of the North and South was, if anything, 
worse than we see today.  Loss of trust in the good faith of those of opposing 
views was epidemic.  Northerners who opposed slavery increasingly 
considered its supporters moral monsters.  Southerners viewed abolitionists 
with equal repugnance as uninformed zealots who did not understand 
beneficent southern institutions and recklessly invited slave rebellion and the 
mass murder of southern whites.  From 1830 to 1860, open violence between 
legislators became increasingly common in the national Capitol building.52  
The most famous of these assaults was South Carolina Congressman Preston 
Brooks’ brutal 1856 beating of Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner on the 
Senate floor in retaliation for Sumner’s speech maligning the “slave 
oligarchy.”53  By 1860, it was reported that many, perhaps most, members of 
both houses were coming to the Capitol armed.54  Open, if irregular, warfare 
 
48. Id. 
49. See, e.g., Richard K. Cralle, ed., IV The Works of John C. Calhoun 542–73 
(1853-1856), excerpted in STAMPP, supra note 44, at 24–29. 
50. WOODWORTH, supra note 47. 
51. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 49. 
52. See generally, JOANNE B. FREEMAN, THE FIELD OF BLOOD: VIOLENCE IN 
CONGRESS AND THE ROAD TO CIVIL WAR (2018). 
53. Id. at 218–22. 
54. Id. at 257. 
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between organized pro- and anti-slavery forces in Kansas began as early as 
1855-56.55   
But these phenomena were symptoms, not causes, of the national 
turmoil.  Slavery and its pervasive consequences caused polarization and 
distrust between sections.  Not the other way around.  Indeed, I am doubtful 
that polarization and distrust are ever causal in any fundamental sense.  It 
seems to me that if people in a previously harmonious polity become polarized 
and distrustful, they do so for reasons particular to their time and 
circumstances, not because the rotations of some mysterious cyclical alchemy 
decree that now is the season for polarization and distrust.   
As for increasing economic inequality, that certainly might be a cause of 
societal disturbance.  But at least in the case of the period of constitutional 
unease preceding the Civil War, I cannot see that it played a material role, 
certainly not the dominant one that would be required to slot this period into 
Balkin’s cycles.  Indeed, so far as I can see, Balkin himself does not make 
much of a case for it doing so.  In a few summary paragraphs, he frames the 
conflict over slavery as resistance by northern Republicans to “an oligarchical 
system that Republicans called the ‘Slave Power.’”56  And he attempts to 
ground Republican resistance largely in fear of “slaveholders’ economic 
dominance – throughout the rest of the country,” by which he presumably 
means both north and west of the core slaveholding states of the South.57  This 
seems a terribly reductionist account of a far more complex struggle.  But 
more to the point, it does not relate to income inequality, at least in any sense 
I would understand the term. 
Normally, one would think of rising income inequality as describing a 
trend in which one segment of the population gains an increasing share of a 
society’s wealth or income relative to some other segment, or perhaps all other 
segments, of the population.  Intuitively, it seems likely that sufficiently large 
disparities could cause discontent with prevailing social and political 
arrangements, and perhaps in due course contribute to the phenomenon Balkin 
calls constitutional rot.  But presumably the political fault lines created by 
rising inequality ought to fall roughly along the divide between those 
advantaged and those disadvantaged by the change.  The disadvantaged will 
become disillusioned with a constitutional order that maintains or increases 
their disadvantage and agitate for change.  The advantaged will maneuver to 
preserve or enhance their advantages.  That is not the story of the lead-in to 
the Civil War. 
Both North and South displayed income inequality (though Balkin never 
tries to show that its degree was increasing notably prior to the War).58  The 
rise of manufacturing in the North permitted larger accumulations of wealth 
 
55. NICOLE ETCHESON, BLEEDING KANSAS: CONTESTED LIBERTY IN THE CIVIL 
WAR ERA 89–112 (2004).  
56. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 52. 
57. Id. 
58. Edward Pessen, The Distribution of Wealth in the Era of the Civil War, 4 
REVS. IN AMER. HISTORY 222 (1976). 
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss2/7
2021] LINEAR THOUGHTS ON CYCLICAL VISION 495 
 
 
in the owners of capital than had previously been possible.59  The workers 
needed to man the new factories, dig the canals, lay the railroad tracks, and so 
forth were often paid little and were often poor even by the standards of the 
time.60  But the North was also characterized by a very large middle class of 
independent farmers, craftsmen, shopkeepers, fishermen, mariners, 
merchants, lawyers, clerics, and the like.61 
In the South, there certainly was a class of wealthy slave-owning 
landowners which exerted disproportionate political power, both locally and 
nationally.62  The income disparity between these nabobs and their Black 
slaves was incommensurable, and the wealth gap between them and poor 
southern whites could be just as great as that between a northern industrialist 
and his factory workers.63 
However, in the gradually accelerating crisis of the 1850s, the laboring 
masses did not rise up against the capitalists of the North, nor did Dixie’s 
hardscrabble white poor revolt against the landed aristocrats of the South.64  
More to the point, the nation’s less fortunate certainly did not organize across 
the Mason-Dixon Line to rearrange the systemic unfairness of the national 
economy.  Any serious student of the Civil War recognizes that economics in 
the broad sense had a great deal to do with the passions and discontents that 
produced secession.65  But I am not aware of any analysis claiming that 
income disparity was a significant contributor to, still less the sole identifiable 
material factor that caused, the accelerating political deterioration – 
constitutional rot, if you will – that led to war. 
The last of Professor Balkin’s causative “Four Horsemen of 
Constitutional Rot” is “policy disasters.”66  It is hard to critique this claim 
because the term is so imprecise and is left effectively undefined.  In place of 
definition, he provides examples: “the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, and the 
2008 global financial crisis.”67  One certainly cannot cavil that the Vietnam 
and Iraq Wars were mistaken wars of choice that killed a great many people, 








65. For a succinct summary of some of the economic circumstances of the period 
and the economic effects of the Civil War, see Roger L. Ransom, The Economics of 
the Civil War, EH.NET, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economics-of-the-civil-war/ 
[https://perma.cc/3NVC-LYRB] (last visited Feb. 3, 2021). 
66. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 49. 
67. Id. at 50. 
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standing in the world.68  But it is not clear what those episodes share with the 
2008 global financial crisis other than unfortunate outcomes.  If one is 
propounding a cyclical theory of history which, at least by implication, would 
permit prediction of future events, it would be helpful to provide more precise 
descriptors of an assertedly key causal factor than. . . policy makers made a 
dog’s breakfast of something important. 
The indeterminacy of Professor Balkin’s conception of a “policy 
disaster” is revealed even more starkly in the discussion of the pre-Civil War 
period, in which he never tells us what “policy disaster,” led to constitutional 
rot.  I suppose the answer might be the advent of slavery in British North 
America; or the Framers’ failure to ban it, or at least put it on the road to rapid 
extinction, in some provision of the Constitution; or the three-fifths clause 
allowing slaveholding states electoral power in proportion to the numbers of 
their human property; or the invention of the Senate, with its representational 
scheme permitting prolonged Southern legislative dominance; or the 
succession of compromises that permitted the gradual expansion of slavery 
into the West; or perhaps American imperialist expansion into the West that 
finally brought the simmering crisis to a head.  But none of those things was 
necessarily any more disastrous than any other.  The problem was slavery 
itself and its metastasis into an evil, but central, pillar of the economic and 
social structure of one-half the country.  The dreadful institution, the 
politically insoluble dilemmas it created, its poisonous persistence, and its 
terrible consequences were sui generis and simply not meaningfully 
comparable to any other “policy” errors, large or small. 
I should add that the consequences of the war that destroyed slavery, 
although not, tragically, other forms of racial subordination, were so 
constitutionally profound that I am particularly resistant to any theory of 
cyclical constitutional time that treats as a continuum the time before and after 
that war.  That cataclysm transformed the United States so dramatically that 
it seems to me a boundary event which any cyclical theory will have a very 
rough time bridging. 
IV.  CYCLICITY, BOUNDARY CONDITIONS, AND THE FAILURE OF THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT CONSENSUS 
Whatever quibbles I may have with Professor Balkin’s particular 
construct, I do not think everything is random.  I do think that human behavior, 
individually and in the mass, has patterns, even if not cycles.  Sometimes those 
patterns are discernible – and discerned better by very capacious intellects like 
Jack Balkin’s.  I also think that, within limits, those patterns, once discovered, 
can help us respond to new circumstances, and may even have mildly 
predictive use. 
 
68. See, e.g., HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., ON STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE VIETNAM WAR (1982) (a post mortem of America’s military and political failure 
in Vietnam); THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN 
IRAQ (2006) (a post mortem of America’s military and political failure in Iraq). 
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One worry I have about even this modest view of the utility of seeking 
recurrent historical patterns is that its utility depends on the maintenance, 
within the region of our study, of at least fundamental boundary conditions 
throughout the period under examination.  Here in my office, I confidently 
expect that, if I drop my coffee cup, it will fall to the floor because gravity 
will pull it rapidly toward the center of the very large mass on whose surface 
I am sitting.  But if we move my office into Earth’s orbit, a dropped cup will 
stubbornly refuse to fall.69 
If we consider the American constitutional project at a high enough level 
of generality, there may indeed be discernible patterns.  But if so, their 
repetition depends, I think, on the maintenance of some fundamental political 
boundary conditions.  In the American setting, one of those conditions is that 
our whole national political enterprise depends at bottom on the 
Enlightenment consensus about the nature of knowledge.  That consensus 
holds that the world is a comprehensible place that can be understood through 
the application of human reason.  That there are facts.  That facts matter.  That 
society should be built on the foundation of a shared factual understanding of 
the world.  And also that there are methods of determining those shared facts 
– including scientific inquiry and the evidentiary processes of the law – which 
will be broadly accepted as authoritative.  Finally, the Enlightenment 
foundation of American constitutionalism insists that a shared commitment to 
seeking truth, and to belief in the modes by which it is determined, is a 
precondition for serious participation in political life.  It is not that we cannot 
argue about what the facts are.  Humans always do that.  But the success of 
our particular system depends on a shared belief that there are facts, and on 
general acceptance of a set of methods or authoritative sources for resolving 
the question. 
What seems to me unique, and uniquely dangerous, about this 
constitutional moment is that this boundary condition may be disappearing.  
Professor Balkin certainly recognizes this issue.  Indeed, he describes it 
eloquently and in detail.  But it is not clear that he is quite willing to accept 
how bad the problem is – how deep is the rot, if you will – or how corrosive 
it may be for his optimistic vision. 
The magnitude of our danger stems in large part from the recognition 
that the centrality of truth, rationality, and recognized sources of authority is 
not just some antique, eighteenth-century notion.  Nor is it only a pillar of 
democratic republicanism.  It is also the foundation of the modern 
 
69. In fact, it will “fall” in the sense of accelerating toward the gravitational 
center of the Earth, but that falling tendency will be offset by its velocity at an angle 
to Earth, producing orbital motion. Because I and the capsule in which I and the cup 
were both enclosed would be subject to the same forces and moving in the same way, 
the cup would not “fall” relative to me, nor drop rapidly onto a wall of the capsule. 
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administrative state.  The truth is that even when the president is a 
knucklehead, Congress is ineffectual, and the courts are ideologically divided, 
most of the things we want the national government to do on a daily basis are 
going to roll along just fine, so long as the career civil servants are left to tend 
their knitting reasonably unmolested – to do their studies, use Administrative 
Procedure Act70 processes to make rational regulations, and administer the 
programs Congress has funded.  What has been especially terrifying about the 
Trump administration is that it cheerfully undermined and degraded this 
apparatus and routinely disparaged the very idea of discoverable truth, 
disinterested expertise, and professional competence. 
The happy version of the 2020 election is that the majority of Americans, 
in just the right proportions in just the right electoral-vote-rich states, rejected 
a man Professor Balkin rightly describes as a classic demagogue.  The more 
foreboding version is that over seventy million Americans, some forty-eight 
percent of the politically active adult population, watched this demagogue in 
action for four years.  Watched him lie, every day.71  Watched him deny 
provable, inescapable facts, day after day.  Watched him denigrate all the 
institutions and norms of constitutional governance, time after time.  And they 
said, “This is good.  We want more.” 
Still more distressingly, now that the election is over, both Mr. Trump 
and his party are continuing to insist that he won, that unseen forces somehow 
inserted literally millions of fraudulent votes into the system, depriving him – 
and them – of victory.  A distressing fraction of the general population 
believes this lie.  They will, I fear, go on believing it.  They will do so because 
they already inhabit a parallel information system which long ago began 
undercutting the very idea of authoritative, rational determination of shared 
facts.  This system disparages science, promotes paranoid fantasy, and 
seduces people into believing nonsense and hating anyone who believes 
otherwise.  Moreover, the information networks that promote this sort of thing 
are becoming even more extreme.  
People of the left and center are wont to disparage Fox News as the locus 
of right-wing disinformation.  It often has been.  But for Trump’s loyalists, 
Fox itself has become suspect because, at least in its “news” division, it has 
grudgingly reported some truths uncongenial to Trump.  Not only is Trump 
himself raging at Fox, but new outlets – e.g., OANN, Newsmax, and 
individual entrepreneurs – have sprouted, flourished, and gained millions of 
viewers by moving politically to the right of Fox and even further away from 
any residual commitment to fact.72  The same is true online, where entire 
 
70. 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. (2020). 
71. Glenn Kessler, Trump made 30,573 false or misleading claims as president. 




72. Nathan Bomey, Could Fox News lose its grip on far-right conservative 
viewers to Newsmax, OAN?, USA TODAY (Dec. 21, 2020), 
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ecosystems of irrational, fact-free discourse have already grown, and seem to 
be gaining strength.73 
More ominously still for a stubbornly two-party system, one of them – 
the Republican Party – has essentially abandoned any pretense of interest in 
facts, at least when inconvenient to the pursuit of power.  In the weeks 
following the election, the majority of nationally elected Republicans actively 
supported President Trump’s efforts to undercut faith in the integrity of the 
American electoral process, or at best remained timorously silent.  Their 
active promotion or passive acceptance of the lie that the presidential election 
was “stolen” by Democrats, or RINOs,74 or the invisible “deep state” 
contributed directly to the violent invasion of the Capitol on January 6, 2021, 
by Trump supporters deluded into believing that lie.  That most, though not 
all, elected Republicans have since grudgingly come around to admitting that 
Donald Trump lost this election will not undo their prior complicity in the 
claim that it was stolen.  Millions and millions of Americans will continue to 
believe, or at least strongly suspect, that dark forces snatched victory from 
them. 
If a significant fraction of the American polity no longer believes in the 
possibility of nationally shared facts, and believes that the election process is 
fundamentally crooked, that, I think, is unique in the American experience.  If 
one of the major parties no longer believes that primary markers of good 
governance are devotion to facts, rationality, and disinterested technical 
competence, that too is unique.  I fear these unique phenomena may have 
changed the boundary conditions for the American system in ways that will 
make restoration of democratic and republican norms and values in the 
coming years far more difficult, and perhaps nearly impossible.   
Perhaps, however, I should take comfort in Jack Balkin’s happier vision.  
At all events, I am pleased that he shared it with us in this book.  We are all 




73. See, e.g., Kaitlyn Tiffany, Parler’s Rise Was Also Its Downfall, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 18, 2021); Hannah Murphy, The new AI tools spreading fake news in 
politics and business, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 9, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/55a39e92-8357-11ea-b872-8db45d5f6714 
[https://perma.cc/9Q7H-QLBJ]. 
74. “RINO” is the disparaging acronym for the phrase “Republicans in name 
only” now applied by members of the far-right to Republicans insufficiently devoted 
to Donald Trump. RINO, DICTIONARY.COM, 
https://www.dictionary.com/e/acronyms/rino/ [https://perma.cc/UGW3-QFXW] (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2021). 
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